This paper considers two methods for pricing assets and examines the relations between them. The ÿrst method is based on the principle of no-arbitrage, which asserts that introduction of the new asset should not create an arbitrage in a market that was before arbitrage free. This condition is satisÿed by prices for the new asset between speciÿc lower and upper limits, determined as the values of certain linear programming problems. The duals of these problems determine a pricing random variable. In the second method of pricing, a new asset is priced so that a given utility maximizing investor will include this asset in his or her portfolio at a zero level. The corresponding price is called the zero-level price. A zero-level price is universal for a class of utility functions if it is a zero-level price for every utility function within that class. This paper shows that universal zero-level prices exist in several important situations. ? 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Introduction
A fundamental problem of ÿnance is that of pricing a new asset introduced into an existing, well-functioning market. The new asset may be a new security, a derivative security, a project in a ÿrm, or a new venture. The price determined should in some appropriate sense be consistent with prices in the market and with investor characteristics.
One method of determining a suitable price is by use of the no-arbitrage principle. If the existing market is assumed to be arbitrage free, it is reasonable to require that introduction of the new asset, at the assigned price, will not create an arbitrage opportunity. This is a powerful and general criterion that is used frequently in modern ÿnance. However, in many cases, the no-arbitrage criterion is not strong enough to produce a single price; rather a range of prices satisfy the condition. To obtain a unique price, additional criteria must be introduced. Like most researchers, we favor criteria that are relatively simple, possess a strong degree of logic, and do not rely on arbitrary parameter choices.
We go beyond the no-arbitrage principle by considering zero-level pricing, which has been introduced earlier in Luenberger (1998) , Smith and Nau (1995) , and Holtan (1997) . In this method, the price is determined such that an investor with a speciÿc utility function will elect to include the new asset in his or her portfolio at the zero level. This has the advantage of being a linear pricing scheme, with the price of a combination of two assets being the corresponding combination of the two individual prices. We show that zero-level prices exist and give conditions for such a price to be unique. This theory uses the special characterization of arbitrage-free prices obtained in the ÿrst part of the paper.
A zero-level price has the apparent disadvantage of being dependent on the particular utility function used for its derivation. To address this, we say that a zero-level price is universal if it is a zero-level price for all utility functions within a large class and all wealth levels. Universal zero-level prices are therefore independent of particular parameter choices. We show that in many situations zero-level prices are in fact universal.
A simple situation that illustrates some of the issues associated with non-marketed assets is that of pricing a coin ip. Suppose that the coin ip pays 10,000 dollars for an outcome of heads and zero for an outcome of tails. Assume that the coin is known to be fair, and that the rate of interest over the period between betting on the ip and its payment is zero. What should be the price of a ip?
The principle of no-arbitrage is of little help for this example. It implies only that the price must lie between zero and 10,000 dollars. Zero-level pricing determines the price at which a particular risk-averse investor would "purchase" the coin ip asset at zero level. That is, it is assumed that a fractional share of the coin ip proposition can be purchased, and the price is assigned so that a speciÿc investor would purchase the asset at zero level. For the coin ip, this price is 5,000 dollars, and most importantly, this price is (essentially) independent of the investor's utility function and level of wealth. In this sense, 5,000 dollars is a universal zero-level price. Because of the universality, this price is free from assumptions on parameter values or functional forms. Universality holds for several important classes of assets.
Assets, prices, and arbitrage
We assume that the collection of marketed assets deÿnes a perfect market in the sense that: there are no transactions costs, it is possible to divide any asset arbitrarily, it is possible to short any asset and receive its price immediately, and the activity of any single individual does not in uence prices. These are idealizations, but they have the agreeable property of being general structural assumptions rather than speciÿc assumptions about parameter values or functional forms. We adhere to these assumptions throughout.
In addition to these assumptions concerning the perfect nature of transactions, we assume that the prices of marketed assets are such that arbitrage is impossible. (We make this precise later in this section.) This assumption provides the basis for a good portion of modern pricing theory and it is useful as a starting point for analysis of non-marketed assets.
We deÿne an asset payo space, say X , in which the payo s of all relevant assets exist. In our framework X is a space of random variables on a probability space (consisting of a set of underlying possibilities together with a probability measure on ). We assume that the elements of X are square-integrable over the probability space, meaning that the expected value of the square exists and is ÿnite. We consider two elements in X to be identical if they di er only on a set of probability zero. We also assume that X is complete, in the sense of a norm as will be discussed later in this section.
The linear span of the marketed payo s is the linear space generated by linear combinations of the marketed payo s. In general, the linear span of the marketed assets is a subset of the given X . However, if the linear span of marketed assets is X , any payo in X can be achieved as a combination of the marketed assets, and the market is said to be complete (with respect to X ). Any new asset with payo in X can then be priced by linear pricing: pricing a combination of assets by the corresponding combination of prices.
Assets live for a common single period of time and have payo s at the end of the period which are in X . If such an asset is a marketed asset it also has a unit price, which is paid at the beginning of the period to acquire one unit and scaled proportionately for other levels.
There is a set of n marketed assets with payo s (ÿnal prices) d 1 ; d 2 ; : : : ; d n and corresponding prices p 1 ; p 2 ; : : : ; p n . We deÿne D=[d 1 ; d 2 ; : : : ; d n ] as the linear mapping that for an n-dimensional vector of amounts =( 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n ) gives the random variable
Likewise, we deÿne the price vector p = (p 1 ; p 2 ; : : : ; p n ). Marketed assets are priced linearly, with the price of an asset with payo
An arbitrage is a combination of assets that produces a (random) payo that is nonnegative and yet has a nonpositive price, one of these conditions being nontrivial. An arbitrage is therefore deÿned by a vector satisfying
(1)
where either the top inequality is nontrivial in the sense that there is a set of positive probability, where D ¿ 0 or the lower inequality is strict. We usually assume that there is no possibility of arbitrage among the marketed assets. If no arbitrage is possible, then, in particular, if there is a non-zero satisfying D = 0, it follows that p · = 0; for otherwise either or − would be an arbitrage.
From this it immediately follows that if d k = i =k i d i ; then p k = i =k i p i , which is the linear pricing rule.
Consider now a new asset with payo e ∈ X that is not marketed and not priced. We wish to assign a price p e to this asset. This is the basic pricing problem.
If e is in the linear span of the d i 's and if we require that the price p e of e not introduce an arbitrage, we deduce immediately that e is also priced linearly; that is, if e is a linear combination of the d i 's, then p e is the same linear combination of the p i 's. Hence, extending pricing to assets in the linear span of the marketed assets is straightforward under the no-arbitrage principle.
When the market is incomplete, there are assets in X that cannot be priced by linearity. Still, we can use the no-arbitrage principle as a ÿrst step of analysis by ÿnding the range of prices such that inclusion of a particular new asset along with the marketed assets does not lead to the possibility of arbitrage. Such price bounds have been considered previously; see Harrison and Kreps (1979) . In Holtan (1997) , it is shown that the bounds are related to linear programming problems as expressed in our somewhat more general setting by the following lemma which is proved in the appendix. 
Note that the constraints may not be feasible, p l e or p u e may not be ÿnite, and even if they are ÿnite, the inf and sup in the lemma may not be achieved. Furthermore, although it is clear from their deÿnitions that p l e 6 p u e , it is not obvious that the prices of Lemma 1 satisfy this inequality. 1 We can obtain results that are more deÿnitive and provide additional insight by considering the dual of each of the linear programs in Lemma 1. However, since the original linear programs have constraint sets that are in (possibly) inÿnite-dimensional spaces, we must develop the dual programs carefully.
The dual programs involve the adjoint of the operator D. As stated earlier D : R n → X . We assume that X is complete under the norm deÿned by x = E(x 2 ). We therefore consider X to be a Hilbert space with the inner product of two elements w ∈ X , v ∈ X deÿned by w · v = E(wv): The adjoint of D maps from X into R n . Applied to an element w ∈ X the adjoint produces wD deÿned as satisfying wD · = w · D for all ∈ R n .
1 However, a short proof assuming feasibility of the constraints is possible: Assume that p u e ¡ p l e : Let l , u satisfy D l 6 e; D u ¿ e; and deÿne
e ¡ 0: Thus u − l is an arbitrage of the marketed assets, which is a contradiction.
With these notions we have dual characterizations of both p l e and p u e expressed by the following two theorems, which are proved in the appendix. Theorem 1. Assume there is no arbitrage among the marketed assets and that e ¿ 0; e = 0. Then p l e is ÿnite and has the two dual characterizations: 
The assumption in Theorem 1 that e be nonnegative is usually satisÿed in applications. The assumption in Theorem 2 that there is an such that D ¿ 1 is satisÿed, for example, by the existence of a risk-free asset.
Characterizations (6) and (8) The dual characterizations also provide an alternative interpretation of the price bounds. A random variable w satisfying the dual constraints is a pricing variable in the sense that any payo in the linear span of the marketed assets is priced by taking the expected value of its product with w. Speciÿcally, a portfolio deÿned by weights of marketed assets, has price
If we ÿnd a random variable w that correctly prices the market assets by p i =E(wd i ), for each i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, we may attempt to price a payo e outside the market span by the same formula: p e = E(we): To avoid arbitrage possibilities for all e ∈ X we must require w ¿ 0, for otherwise a positive payo could have a negative price. Hence the dual programs (6) and (8) imply that the price bounds are the bounds obtained with respect to all possible arbitrage-free pricing variables w that correctly price the marketed assets.
A ÿnal technical point of interest is the case where p l e = p u e : A strong conclusion can be inferred.
Theorem 3. Assume that p l e = p u e and both are ÿnite. Then either e is linearly dependent on the marketed assets; there is a dependency among the marketed assets; or there is an arbitrage among the marketed assets.
Proof. Lemma A.5 (in the appendix) implies that there is an l that solves (5); the primal for the lower bound. We have p · l = p l e and D l − e 6 0: Likewise; there is u that solves (7) 
Zero-level pricing
The idea of zero-level pricing of a non-marketed payo e is to ÿnd the price p e such that a certain investor will elect to neither purchase nor short it. At the price p e the investor is indi erent to the inclusion of e. This section shows that this concept is well deÿned in the sense that such a p e exists.
Consider an investor having a utility function U deÿned for positive values of ÿnal wealth. Positive random payo s x ∈ X are ranked by their expected utility E[U (x)]. We assume that U is continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave. The investor has initial wealth W ¿ 0 that is to be allocated among the available assets.
As before, the n marketed assets are deÿned by their payo s d i ∈ X , i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. There is an additional asset with payo e. We assume that there is no linear dependency among the marketed assets.
Given a price p e the investor seeks to solve the following problem, which is standard in the ÿnite-state case; see e.g. Luenberger (1998 D + e e = x;
Theorem 4. If there is no arbitrage and all assets are linearly independent, there is a unique solution to problem (9).
Proof. Without loss of generality we take e = 0 and p e = 0 (and e = 0). Consider the constraint set A = { : D ¿ 0; p · 6 W }. We will show that A is bounded. Assume not. Then there is, by convexity of A, a sequence of k 's in A with k = k. Let ÿ k = k =k. Then ÿ k = 1 for each k. Therefore, there is a subsequence of the ÿ k 's converging to a ÿ. For this limit point ÿ, we have Dÿ ¿ 0; p· ÿ 6 0: If either of these inequalities is strict, there would be an arbitrage. If Dÿ = 0 there would be a linear dependency. Since neither of these is possible, A is bounded. It is also clear that A is closed. Hence it follows from continuity that (9) has a solution.
To prove that the solution is unique, assume that 1 and 2 are solutions, both with value V . By the convexity of the constraints it follows that 0 = The solution to the utility maximization problem (9) deÿnes a mapping F from a price p e to a purchase level e = F(p e ). Under appropriate conditions, as spelled out in the next theorem, there is a p e that yields e = 0. This p e is the zero-level price for the investor.
In Theorem 5 below, we require a di erentiability assumption for uniqueness. For technical simplicity, we take this to mean that functions of the form E[U ( 1 d 1 + 2 d 2 + · · · + n d n )] are continuously di erentiable with respect to the i 's.
Theorem 5. Assume no arbitrage is possible among the n marketed securities, and that e ¿ 0, e is bounded above, and e is independent of the marketed assets. Then there is a (zero-level) price p 0 e such that F(p 0 e ) = 0: This price is unique if: there is a marketed portfolio deÿned by 0 such that 2 D 0 ¿ 1; utility is continuously di erentiable, and the solution x * to (9) with e = 0, p e = 0 has x * ¿ 0:
Proof. According to Theorems 1 and 2, p l e and p u e are ÿnite and their corresponding primal problems achieve their extreme values. Assume ÿrst that p l e ¡ p u e : Let l solve (5), the primal problem for the lower limit. It is clear that e − D l ¿ 0 and that this inequality is not satisÿed as equality, since e is linearly independent of the marketed assets. Therefore there is ¿ 0 and ¿ 0 such that on a set of probability , there holds e − D l ¿ :
. Let V be the maximum expected utility that can be achieved using nonpositive levels of e in the portfolio for p e = p Since reducing p e cannot increase the value obtained with nonpositive values of e, it follows that for the optimal solution will have e ¿ 0: Hence, F(p e ) ¿ 0 for values of p e ¿ p l e su ciently close to p l e : Likewise let u solve (7), the primal for the upper bound p u e . An argument similar to that above shows that p e = p u e − for su ciently small positive will lead to optimal solutions of (9) with a negative amount of e. Thus F(p e ) ¡ 0 for values of p e ¡ p u e su ciently close to p u e . Since U is continuous and the budget constraint is linear, it follows (see Berge, 1963, p. 116 ) that F is continuous on (p l ; p u ). Hence from the intermediate-value theorem there is p 0 e such that F(p 0 e ) = 0. In other words there is a zero-level price. We now show that p 0 e is unique, and for this we assume the existence of the portfolio 0 with D 0 ¿ 1, di erentiability of U , and that the optimal solution (of the marketed system) has x * ¿ 0: The necessary conditions for the solution x * to (9) when p e = p
for each i = 1; 2; : : : ; n; and
The budget constraint will be met with equality because it is always advantageous to spend surplus wealth on the portfolio 0 . Accordingly, owing to the concavity of U and the inequality in the budget constraint, the Lagrange multiplier is positive; see Luenberger (1969) .
Suppose that there were two zero-level prices. Since, the asset e is held at zero level, a solution pair x * ; for one of these values must be a solution pair for the other. From (11) it follows immediately that p 0 e is unique. Now consider the case p l e = p u e . From Theorem 3, we know that e is in the linear span of marketed assets and is consistent with the prices of those assets. This is a zero-level price, since any solution having e at a non-zero level can be converted to a solution having e at zero level by substituting the combination of marketed assets that duplicate e.
If there is a marketed risk-free asset with return R, we may use it in (10) to obtain
Hence (11) may be written as
The condition that x * ¿ 0 will be automatically satisÿed for a U that severely penalizes ÿnal wealth values close to zero. For example, the utility functions U (x) = ln x and U (x)=−x − for ¿ 0 have this property. It can be argued that utility functions of this form are likely to represent the preferences of sophisticated investors. See Luenberger (1993) .
The results of Theorems 4 and 5 can be easily extended to the case where U is deÿned over both positive and negative values of ÿnal wealth and the constraint x ¿ 0 is eliminated. In particular, the necessary conditions are then the same as above.
Combining these conditions, we say that a utility function is in class U if it is continuously di erentiable and x * ¿ 0 is known to hold or the constraint x * ¿ 0 is not present. 
Linearity and arbitrage-free pricing
Under the uniqueness assumptions of Theorem 5, we have from (11)
This can be written as
where w = U (x * )= .
It is clear that if x
* is optimal when the price of e is p 0 e , then it is also optimal when a new asset e is adjoined with a price of p Since U is strictly increasing, U (x * ) ¿ 0: Also ¿ 0. It follows that w ¿ 0, which means that w is a positive pricing variable, and this means that the prices that w produces lead to an overall system that is arbitrage free (since e ¿ 0 implies p 0 e ¿ 0). We state these observations as a corollary.
Corollary 1.
Under the uniqueness conditions of Theorem 5; zero-level pricing is linear and arbitrage free.
Universality
Zero-level pricing provides an arbitrage-free price for a new asset, but it has the apparent disadvantage of being dependent on the utility function and the wealth of the individual. This is not a disadvantage for a particular individual who wishes to determine the threshold value for purchase of the asset, but it lacks the deÿniteness associated with a robust pricing theory. Fortunately, there are several situations in which the zero-level price is independent of the utility function and wealth. The most important case is when utility functions are restricted to the class U. Accordingly, we say the zero-level price is universal if it is the same for all utility functions in U and all positive wealth levels. The simplest case of universality (within U) is when the marketed assets are complete. We discuss other important cases below.
Statistical independence
Suppose e is statistically independent of all marketed assets and there is a risk-free asset with return R. Then (12) reduces to
which is independent of U and W , and hence is universal. The coin ip example falls into this category. Its outcome is independent of all marketed assets and hence the zero-level price is its expected value, discounted by the risk-free rate. This is true regardless of the utility function and wealth. Thus p 0 e is universal for the coin ip example.
This result can be used to price any asset subject to private uncertainty-uncertainty that is independent of any marketed asset-for example, projects that are subject only to isolated technical uncertainties. Any such asset can be priced according to the discounted expected value of its payo , and this price is a universal zero-level price.
Normal random variables
Consider next the case where the payo s of all assets are normally distributed. The random variable e can then be written as e = y + z; where y is a linear combination of the d i 's (that is, y =D for some ) and z is uncorrelated with (and hence independent of) the d i 's. The zero-level price of e is then the sum of the zero-level prices of y and z. The zero-level price of y is p · (for the for which y = D ) and the zero-level price of z is E(z)=R: The total price is independent of the utility function and hence is universal.
Partially complete markets
Roughly speaking, a single-period market is partially complete if it is complete with respect to all (measurable) functions of market payo s, although there are other assets whose payo s are not functions of market payo s. See Smith and Nau (1995) and Holtan (1997) . We present the concept here for the single-period case with n linearly independent marketed assets with payo s d i , i = 1; 2; : : : ; n: Let (as deÿned earlier) be the underlying set of possible outcomes. Let F be a partition of into a ÿnite number k of measurable sets such that: (1) the payo of each marketed asset is constant on every set in F , (that is, the payo s are adapted to F), and (2) F is the coarsest partition with property (1), (that is, k is minimal). We say F is the partition generated by the market. The market is said to be partially complete (with respect to F) if n = k and there are other asset payo s in X that are not adapted to F.
Consider a ÿnite-state model, where consists of a ÿnite number S of elements. If the n marketed assets are linearly independent, a partially complete market has n = k ¡ S: If n = S the market is complete. Example 1. To illustrate; suppose there are 4 states s 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 ; s 4 and two marketed assets: a stock with payo represented by the 4-tuple (u; u; d; d) (with u = "up" and d = "down"); and a bond with payo (1; 1; 1; 1). The generated partition F is {s 1 ; s 2 }; {s 3 ; s 4 }. Hence k = 2 = n ¡ S = 4 so the market is partially complete if there are additional assets not adapted to this partition.
We have the following theorem (which is a variation of a result in Holtan (1997) ).
Theorem 6. Suppose the market is partially complete. Then the zero-level price of a payo e is universal.
Proof. Let F be the partition generated by the marketed assets; and suppose that p 0 e is the zero-level price determined by the uniqueness criteria of Theorem 5. We have
Since U (x * ) is adapted to F, we may use the tower property of conditional expectation to write
Now E[e|F] is adapted to F and hence by partial completeness, it can be represented as a linear combination of the marketed payo s, and thus it is priced uniquely according to that linear combination. Its price does not depend on U (x * )= . Hence p 0 e is independent of U and the wealth W .
As a special case, suppose the risk-free asset is the only marketed asset. We may then take F = and the price of any payo e is p 0 e = E[e]=R; which is universal. In general, if the market is partially complete, only the expected value of e on each of the elements of F is required to determine the universal zero-level price.
Quadratic utility
We can show that the zero-level price of e is the same for all individuals with quadratic utility, independent of their level of wealth and the speciÿc parameters of the quadratic.
Quadratic utility is problematic, of course, because it is not increasing everywhere. However, we can treat it formally and in practice assume that it is employed only over the range where it is increasing.
Concave quadratic utility functions have the form U (x) = a + bx − cx 2 , where c ¿ 0: It is clear that a constant can be added to U and U can be multiplied by a positive constant without changing the relative assessment of payo s. Hence, it is su cient to consider the family U (x)=bx − 1 2 x 2 ; or equivalently, U (x)=b−x. Let us ÿrst formally take the case b = 0; (we say formally because with b = 0 the quadratic decreases for positive x). We assume that a risk-free asset with return R is marketed.
If 0 is the optimal portfolio of marketed assets for a level of wealth W = 1; 0 satisÿes the necessary conditions
for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n and some 0 . It must also satisfy p · 0 = 1. For b = 0 and W = 1 consider the portfolio deÿned by amounts b = 0 and an additional amount b of the risk-free asset with payo 1, where will be selected later. The payo is x b = D b + b. Let b = 0 . These choices satisfy the necessary conditions
for each i. We select to satisfy the budget constraint We show that all these solutions assign the same price to e. We ÿnd
which is independent of b and W . Hence p 0 e is universal with respect to all quadratic utility functions.
Conclusions
The range of arbitrage-free prices for a new asset consists of an interval whose endpoints can be expressed as values of certain linear programming problems. This range may be so broad that it is of little use for determining a price. However, the structure of these linear programs and their duals provide valuable analytic information. The range of acceptable prices is reduced considerably by requiring that a price be a zero-level price for some utility function. And it is the analytic structure of the arbitrage-free interval that provides the means for establishing the existence of zero-level prices.
If the range of acceptable prices under the zero-level requirement shrinks to a single point, that price is termed a universal zero-level price. Universal zero-level prices exist in many situations, and such prices have great appeal as the single logical price to assign to a new asset. Proof. Following Holtan (1997) ; arbitrage is possible only in a portfolio with e included at some non-zero level. First suppose that e is included at a negative level; which without loss of generality can be taken to be the level −1. An arbitrage is then deÿned by an satisfying
with one of these inequalities being nontrivial as described earlier. If a value of p e satisÿes this condition; then clearly any larger value satisÿes it as well. Hence;
If D − e ¿ 0 is not feasible; we set the inf to +∞. To establish the formula for p l e we consider e at the +1 level and use − to represent positions in the marketed assets. Hence an arbitrage is an satisfying D − e 6 0; (A.5)
with one of these inequalities being nontrivial. If a value of p e satisÿes this condition, then clearly any smaller value also satisÿes it. Hence,
If D − e 6 0 is not feasible, we set the sup to −∞.
Theorem A.1. Assume there is no arbitrage among the marketed assets and that e ¿ 0; e = 0. Then p l e is ÿnite and has the two dual characterizations: p is an arbitrage among the marketed assets; contrary to our assumption.
Next we state the standard inequality that holds between feasible solutions of a linear program and its dual. S is a closed; convex cone. The half-line {(p e ; p): p e 6 p l e } is not inŜ: Hence there is a hyperplane separatingŜ and the half-line. That is; there is a non-zero (y; ) with yp e + p · ¿ yw · e + wD · for all w ¿ 0 and all p e 6 p Combining these lemmata we obtain the strong characterizations of the main arbitrage theorems. Proof of Theorem A.2. Feasibility of the primal (A.9) is obtained by scaling of the assumption so that D ¿ e: The dual is feasible by Lemma A.2. The remainder of the proof follows from the analogs of the lemmata derived earlier.
Proof of Theorem

